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Introduction 
 
The Indonesian economy was dominated by the government in the decades of 
the 1970s and 1980s through its control of major mining, manufacturing and 
agricultural activities. Hill (2000) estimates that as much as 40% of non-
agricultural GDP was accounted for by government entities in the late 1980s 
There were still a lot of government corporations up until the late 1980s and early 
1990s and governmental control over the banking system was still substantial.  
 
Non-financial state owned enterprises (SOEs) contributed 14.5% of GDP in the 
late 1980s. They also accounted for another 9% of gross domestic investment 
which rose to 15.7% over the period 1990 –1997 (World Bank, 2000). Three 
SOEs are of particular note that dominate the sector in terms of revenue and 
assets are Pertamina (monopoly in oil and gas with diversified holdings in hotels, 
an airline and office buildings); PLN and PTTelkolm (monopoly in power and 
telecommunications industry respectively). The SOEs also employ a significant 
percentage of the labor force (25% according to data from the Indonesia’ 
Statistics Office).   
 
 This strong role of the state was derived from the historical break with its colonial 
past under President Suharto and the distrust of “capitalists”. There was also a 
need for the Suharto regime in the three decades when he ruled to maintain 
control of enough industries to maintain its base for extortion and corruption.  
 
There was only a gradual and delayed shift toward export promotion and away 
from import substitution. This was partly the result of lobbying by entrenched 
interests that were making monopoly profits from new protected industries and 
corrupt officials that were operating the customs and port facilities. It also had to 
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do with the control of key allocation and production agencies like Bulog and 
Pertamina. 
 
The decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s put pressure on the government to 
develop a more competitive economic environment which was reinforced by the 
growing integration of economies in Southeast Asia in conjunction with 
commitments to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Policy measures focused on 
trade barriers. Tariffs were lowered and some import monopolies and import 
licenses were converted to tariff equivalents. There were also reforms in banking 
and the regulation of foreign direct investment. However, these reforms were 
partial in nature. Several banks remain under government control and policy 
required domestic partnerships for foreign direct investment (FDI) approval (see 
Dowling and Yap (2005) for further details.   
 
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings in the policy environment, there was a 
measurable improvement in competition and economic efficiency, particularly in 
the manufacturing sector. Pangestu et al (2002) show that there was a decline in 
the level of industrial concentration and that the size distribution of firms has 
become more equal over time. There was also a decline in the prevalence of 
dominant firms therefore enhancing competition and reducing monopoly power. 
Finally, there was less stability in market shares after 1990, a development which 
reflects greater competition1.    
 
 
The evidence of enhanced competition over the decades of the ‘80s and’90s is 
much less compelling in other sectors of the economy, including agriculture, 
services, infrastructure and some parts for manufacturing and mining sectors. 
There are a number of examples that can be cited to support this conclusion 
including the cement industry (where there were high tariffs on imports, 
restrictions on number of distributors and allocation of markets) as well as gas 
distribution, telecommunications and electricity (where an opaque regulatory 
framework prohibited a level playing field from developing as new entrants came 
into the market). Furthermore, in the telecoms sector the government remained 
the majority shareholder in PT. Telkom and Indosat.  
 
Developments in Competition Policy 
 
In the late 1990s a debate developed as to whether the country was in need of 
detailed legislation and government policy regarding the regulation and 
supervision of domestic competition. On the one hand Hill (1999) and Bird (1999) 
                                                 
1 Despite these positive developments some economists have argued that these measures of 
concentration alone are not a necessary and sufficient condition of evidence for increased 
competitiveness and economic efficiency. It is possible in the Indonesian context, for example, 
that concentration results from greater economic efficiency (See (Bird (1999), Aswicahyono et al 
(2001) and Pangestu et al (2002).  
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argued that an open trading environment was a sufficiently powerful and yet 
simple way to handle monopoly. In their view, if markets were ‘contestable’ the 
issue of high levels of concentration would not arise. Liberalization of 
international trade would accomplish this and there would be no need to develop 
another bureaucratic entity to enforce competition. The market would ensure the 
maintenance of competition in an open Indonesian economy.  
 
Other economists suggested that some form of antitrust/antimonopoly agency 
was needed to regulate dominant firms (Boner and Krueger (1991) and Khemani 
(2000) if they were able to exploit market power. Boner and Krueger (1991), 
Khemani (2000) and other economists holding this view were careful to note that 
big doesn’t necessarily mean bad and that careful analysis is needed to 
determine whether these dominant firms were engaged in anti-competitive or 
restrictive business practices. They also noted the importance of curbing anti-
competitive behavior in the non-traded goods sectors where markets were not 
‘contestable’. Antitrust and monopoly laws are often invoked to restrict mergers 
between major competitors as well as to prohibit or control the formation of 
interlocking directorates of major competitors. The potential for abuse of market 
power through vertical integration would also be within the purview of such a 
regulatory agency overseeing competitive practices. 
 
 
The Role of the IMF and the Competition Law of 1999 
 
The 1997 financial crisis and the insistence of the IMF that a number of policy 
reforms be introduced created a dramatic change in the regulatory environment 
in Indonesia. The IMF bail out package of $46 billion was extensive and covered 
reforms in many areas including reduction in some export taxes; elimination of 
Bulog and the clove monopoly; liberalization of imports of many agricultural 
commodities including wheat, soybeans and sugar; reduction in import tariffs; 
removal of trade monopolies in cement, rattan and plywood; removal of local 
content requirements for automobiles; removal of restrictions on FDI and 
enforcement of extensive macroeconomic targets.  
 
Furthermore, the IMF required Indonesia to pass laws that ensure fair 
competition. This eventually led to the enactment of Law No. 5 of 1999 
Concerning the Prohibition of  Monopolistic Practices and Unhealthy/Unfair 
Business Competition (popularly know as the Competition Law or the Law) in 5 
March,1999. The general purpose of the Law is similar to competition laws in 
other countries. It prohibits/prevents monopolistic practices and restricts mergers 
or acquisitions that increase market concentration as well as prohibiting 
exploitation by firms with market control. As with most competition laws the letter 
of the law is subject to interpretation. In the Indonesian case the objectives of the 
Law are loosely written to allow a variety of different interpretations. We discuss 
a few cases below. 
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Market  dominance.   The general objectives of the Law are spelled out in article 
3 of the legislation. It aims to improve economic efficiency and people’s welfare, 
regulating the business climate to ensure competition in order to maintain equal 
opportunities for small, medium and large business firms, to prevent unhealthy 
business competition practices and finally to encourage effectiveness and 
efficiency in business practices through fostering competition and best business 
practices. This article contains several different provisions and has been subject 
to several different interpretations.  As a result the basic thrust of the Law, which 
should be to maintain and promote competition as a means to achieving 
economic efficiency, has been lost. For example, (Thee, 2002) argues that a 
different interpretation of the provision to “maintain equal opportunities for small, 
medium and large business firms” could suggest market segmentation and 
protection of the rights of different sized firms when the spirit of the Law is to 
ensure competitive markets no matter how large firms are.  
 
Several articles of the Law spell out the maximum market shares for monopolies, 
monopsonies, oligopolies and oligopsonies that would trigger action by the 
commission charged with enforcing the Law, Commission to Monitor Business 
Competition (the KPPU). Another provision prohibits the acquisition of a 
competitor’s stock if it results in a market share of the firms together that is too 
large.  These two provisions of the law suggest that there is an overarching 
concern with the size of large firms rather than whether they are involved in 
unfair business practices. These provisions also seem to suggest that  “Big is 
bad” based on prima facia evidence of the size of firms.  
 
A more realistic objective would be to set market shares as a trigger point for 
possible investigation of violations of competition rather than as a blanket rule for 
prohibiting the growth or the establishment of large companies. In a global 
marketplace a highly efficient firm could have a large share of the domestic 
market and still be a highly competitively player in international markets.  
 
Protection of small firms. The explicit inclusion of the terms small, medium and 
large to describe different kinds of business enterprises creates an impression 
that competition and competition policy will take into special account the nature 
of the size of enterprise. A predisposition to protect small enterprises is certainly 
reasonable within the context of Indonesia and other countries. In the United 
States, antitrust law had a pro small business orientation in the years following 
WW II. However a shift in emphasis toward ensuring economic efficiency has 
become more evident in the United States as the forces of globalization have 
made more markets contestable and the ability of small firms to meet 
international competition has been eroded (see Fox (2001)). Indonesia would do 
well to follow a similar strategy in response to globalization. 
 
Protection of market share. Complementary to the general protection of the rights 
of firms of different sizes under the Law, several articles - 4,13,17,18 - suggest 
that the objective is to limit the growth of large firms while protecting the market 
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share of smaller firms Wie (2002).  Furthermore, exemptions from the Law are 
granted to small–scale businesses and cooperatives. This framing of the Law’s 
provisions implies that there is a concern for protecting some sectors of the 
business community rather than promoting free competition by guaranteeing a 
level playing for all firms, no matter what their size. 
 
Horizontal and vertical integration. Horizontal integration is addressed in several 
articles of the Law, particularly in restrictions in market control and in the 
restrictions against price fixing, bid rigging, market segmentation/allocation. 
Vertical integration is more difficult to ascertain, particularly as it pertains to small 
businesses. In the United States, for example, the small business administration 
does not explicitly prohibit vertical integration. Vertical integration can facilitate 
competition by introducing more efficient product distribution yet it can also 
reduce competition by developing collusive tactics or restricting entry. In the case 
of industries having close linkages with overseas businesses it is possible that 
vertical integration can serve to lock out potential competitors. In any event it is 
important that Indonesia develop the expertise required to evaluate the various 
aspects of (particularly) vertical integration. For example, Wie (2002) argues that 
vertical integration in the engineering goods assembly sector including motor 
vehicles, diesel engines and other motorized equipment should be analyzed with 
an open mind. This is particularly true when it is recognized that many of these 
vertically integrated relationships were undertaken and encouraged by the 
Department of Industry as part of its industrial deepening strategy. A major 
objective should be to examine whether the existing relationships restrict 
competition by prohibiting the entry of new firms. 
 
Exemptions.  Several sectors are exempt from the provisions of the Law. These 
include intellectual property and small-scale enterprises (SMEs). The justification 
for this latter exemption is to give SMEs some protection against the predatory 
actions of large firms as well as to maintain a diverse distribution of firms of 
different sizes with different skill requirements. On the other hand, Wie (2002) 
argues that the exemption of small-scale enterprises will not enhance their 
competitive advantage relative to larger scale enterprises. Rather it could allow 
SMEs and cooperatives to engage in anti-competitive behavior.   
 
Policy and administrative barriers to competition. There are already a number of 
existing barriers to competition as a result of past government policy. There are 
many cartels in existence, including for cement, plywood, paper and fertilizer. 
There are also price controls on sugar, rice and cement as well as exclusive 
licensing for clove marketing and wheat flour milling (see Wie (2002)). The Law is 
silent on the continued existence of these restrictions on competition and there 
are no stipulations in the Law that prevents the future actions of Government to 
create new monopolies or other barriers to competition. For example, with the 
devolution of power to the provinces and local authorities, local governments 
may put up barriers to competition and trade by introducing preferential 
government procurement practices or by requiring local content for the 
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production of some products (see Goodpaster and Ray (2000). For example 
Central Sulawesi government established a private cartel to control shipment of 
raw rattan (see Bennet et al (1998)) by prohibiting others from trading raw rattan. 
 
 
 
Implementation experience  
 
So far the KPPU has investigated a number of complaints and issued decisions 
in several others. Here we review the two major cases that were handled up to 
2003 and comment on several others. 
 
Caltex Pacific Indonesia(CPI). This was the first case handled by KPPU. KPPU 
ruled that there had been collusion between bidders to supply pipe requirements 
for a particular project to CPI. The alleged violation resulted from a change in 
tender requirements initiated by Pertamina that all bidders offer a package of 
both low and high grade quality pipes that was not announced publicly in the 
newspapers. KPPM found that there had been collusion between bidders.  It 
ordered that the tender bidding be stopped.  Since the change in tender 
requirements was initiated by Pertamina there was a possibility that the change 
in requirements could have led to confusion in the bidding process. This may not 
have been well understood by KPPU  (For further details see Pangestu et al 
(2002) and references contained therein). 
 
P.T. Indomaret  This was an action brought against a large retail chain 
(P.T.Indomaret. ) for competing unfairly with smaller traditional retailers in the 
greater Jakarta region. After investigation, KPPU did not find a strong case for 
predatory pricing by lowering prices temporarily to drive out competitors nor did it 
find a strong case for vertical integration. Nevertheless, perhaps under political 
pressure) KPPU ruled that P.T. Indomaret should not continue to expand in 
markets where they were in direct competition with traditional sellers. They did 
not find any violations of the Law by P.T. Indomaret. This decision is a blow to 
large retailers who might undertake further expansion into large urban markets, 
particularly Jakarta, and also to consumers who might benefit from the large 
scale economies that such retailers bring (e.g. WalMart chain in the US).  
 
New Cases  KPPU is investigating a number of private and state owned 
enterprises for violations of the Law. A list compiled by Pangestu et al (2002) 
includes cooking oil, instant noodles, wheat flour, mineral water, detergent, 
lubricating oil, sea, land and train transport and the telecoms market. In addition 
a team from USAID (Loughlin et al 1999) has suggested several other markets 
that might be subject to restrictive practices, including pulp and paper, cement, 
rattan and sandlewood, and foreign films import. Some of these industries and 
activities are protected from foreign competition while in other cases markets are 
closed to other domestic producers. In other instances, government restrictions 
favor local producers and in others the government has created a monopsony 
 6
which suppresses prices to producers. In addition further investigations may 
have been initiated since these research papers were written.  
 
State owned enterprises (SOEs).  There are a number of SOEs that may be in 
violation of the Law. Among the most inefficient appear to be Pertamina (where 
the new President just removed all of the directors) and Krakatau Steel.  SOEs 
are generally beyond the reach of KPPU, although KPPU could bring pressure 
on the government to open them up to greater competition. For example, 
Loughlin et al (1999) suggest that KPPU can provide an effective lobby to open 
up the steel industry to foreign competition. It could also serve as an advocate for 
the introduction of more transparent antidumping legislation that imposes duties 
on a wide variety of imported steel products.   
 
Enforcement Issues2
 
Legal enforcement of decisions by the KPPU is an issue that is still being 
reviewed and revised. KPPU can impose a variety of sanctions including 
administrative and criminal sanctions. Class actions are also possible wherein 
case the KPPU commission could act both as prosecutor and judge. These could 
include compensation for damages to injured parties as well as criminal 
sentencing. The KPPU serves as a judiciary body equivalent to the District Court. 
The District Court itself hears appeals rather than the Appeals Court. Further 
appeals would go to the Supreme Court. Because the KPPU is new a good deal 
of coordination is required with the Courts and law enforcement.  Maarif (2004) 
argues that the KPPU Commission should be flexible in application of its ruling 
so that cease and desist orders can be enforced and penalties imposed without 
any civil or criminal action being taken. Agreement to cease and desist could also 
occur without the Commission having to declare a verdict. This system of 
procedures is similar to that followed by the US Federal Trade Commission.  
 
As far as sanctions of Government officials is concerned, the Law appears to 
prohibit any legal action against them. Its authority only extends to the private 
sector. The alternative would be for the KPPU Commissioners to urge the 
Government to sanction its officials. This could be done informally or through the 
courts. In the latter case, the KPPU would ask the Attorney General to file a case. 
 
There are a number of other issues to be considered in order for KPPU to 
operate more effectively. These include the opening of regional offices of the 
KPPU so that logistically it would be easier for those involved in provincial 
disputes, the speedy dissemination of information to relevant businesses and 
government agencies regarding the role and scope of authority of the KPPU.  
 
 
Conclusions and suggestions for further action 
 
                                                 
2 This section is based, in large part, on Maarif (2004)  
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In general, competition policy plays an important role in increasing 
competitiveness and economic efficiency. Indonesia has made substantial 
progress in raising competitiveness. Indonesia has been compared to industrial 
and developing countries in a number of surveys. While ranked next to last in a 
ranking of 60 countries in the World Competitiveness Report (2005) it was 
ranked 44 out of 103 countries in terms of business competitiveness in the 
Global Competitiveness Report (2005) and 69 out of 104 countries in terms of 
growth competitiveness.  In another ranking of export competitiveness compiled 
by Ganeshan Wignaraja (2003) based on manufactured export growth, 
manufactured exports per capita and the share of technology-intensive exports in 
total exports, Indonesia  ranked 16th out of 82 developing countries. It ranked 2nd 
in manufactured export growth between 1980 and 1999. Of the 82 countries 
reviewed, only Mexico ranked higher.  
 
While much has already been done to intensify competition and create 
contestable markets, much remains to be done. First, enforcement of competition 
policy prevents/discourages existing firms from preventing entry of potential rivals. 
This will help create incentives for innovation by new companies as well as 
existing firms that face potential competition.  New firms recognizing a level 
playing field are more likely to invest in innovation.  
 
Second, interfirm rivalries are generally associated with greater levels of 
innovation and productivity increase, although there may be cases when 
inefficiency would result from unlimited entry. These cases must be reviewed 
carefully. 
 
Third, by preventing restrictive practices, competition policy guarantees a wider 
array of products and service at competitive prices.  
 
Fourth, there is a dynamic tension between protection of intellectual property and 
the enforcement of competition. Protection of intellectual property protects and 
preserves the incentives for innovation since firms are more likely to innovate if 
they are protected from free riders. On the other hand, continued protection can 
lead to the development of monopoly power if these rights are not flexible 
enough to respond to new innovations and ideas. In the case of Indonesia much 
of the protection of intellectual property involves infringement of the rights of 
foreign firms through illegal copies of music, videos and consumer products.  
 
Fifth, there are significant export constraints that relate to the imposition of illegal 
duties and levies and local government regulations. Surveys of exporters by 
Kunchoro (2004) suggest that around 40 percent of respondents mentioned 
these factors as key export constraints. Elimination of these constraints and the 
corrupt practices that go along with them would go a long way toward increasing 
the economic efficiency of exporters and of the private sector.  
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Turning to specifics, KPPU has been and will continue to be pressured by 
different interest groups including the branches of Government to move in 
particular directions. Small businesses want protection from large conglomerates 
and large firms want the flexibility to form strategic alliances and to avail of 
economies of scale to increase efficiency and meet foreign competition. In the 
face of these competing interests, KPPU has to develop a clear vision of its role 
in increasing economic efficiency through greater competition and be actively 
involved in explaining this role to the public. It is all the more critical since the 
Law itself is difficult to understand and somewhat vague and subject to different 
interpretations. In decisions taken so far the KPPU seems to have favored small 
business. One alternative would be for the Government to introduce policies that 
support small business so that KPPU can focus more on policies that promote 
competition and economic efficiency irregardless of the size of the firms involved. 
In any event the  
 
“…conflict between a pro-competitive or efficiency approach, and an anti-big 
business approach or market power approach which is politically more popular 
needs to be resolved.” (Pangestu et al (2002, p. 223)  
 
It may be more appropriate to develop other instruments to deal with equity 
issues rather than applying competition policies to achieve this end.  
 
KPPU and the Government need to coordinate the work of the Law with other 
agencies that deal with the deregulation of state owned enterprises in the 
electricity, telecommunications and oil and gas sectors. This should include a 
clear distinction between jurisdictions and coordination of respective policies to 
ensure that competition and economic efficiency are best served.  
 
Many of the competition issues to be resolved require extensive economic 
analysis. The work done by the team that prepared the USAID paper (Loughlin et 
al (1999) is a good example of the kind of expertise involved. This would require 
KPPU to develop a strong staff capability to undertake such analysis. The size of 
this staff would depend upon the work load and the number of cases brought to it 
and the scope of its own initiatives. Without such staff support to provide solid 
analysis its decision making power could be undermined and its decisions 
questioned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References  
 
Aswicahyono, Haryo, D. Ardiyuanto and T. Anas (2001) “The Sources of Market Performance in 
Indonesian Manufacturing Industry” The Indonesian Quarterly 29 22-33. 
 
Bennet, C.P.A., S.V. Marks and L. Muslimin (1998) “Policy Influences on Central Sulawesi Rattan 
Production and Distribution,” Trade Implementation and Policy Project, USAID and Indonesian 
Ministry of Trade 
 
Bird, Kelly (1999) “Concentration in Indonesian Manufacturing 1975-1993” Bulletin of Indonesia 
Economic Studies 35 (April) 71-100 
 
Boner, R.A. and R. Krueger (1991) “The Basics of Antitrust Policy: A Review of Ten Nations and 
the European Community” World Bank Technical Paper 160, World Bank, Wash. D.C. 
 
Dowling, M. and C. Yap (2006) “Indonesian Economic Development – Mirage or Miracle? 
Forthcoming in conference volume, Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press. 
 
Fox, Eleanor (2001) “Competition Law: Indonesia’s Experience and Comparisons with US 
Experience” Peg Project on Indonesian Institution Building in a Globalized Economy. 
 
Goodpaster, Gary and D. Ray (2000 ) “Competition Policy and Decentralization,” paper presented 
at World Bank, ADB, USAID, Aus AID International Conference on Competition Policy and 
Economic Adjustment, Jakarta 
 
Hill, Hal (1999) “Indonesia’s Microeconomic policy Challenges: Industry Policy, competition Policy 
and Small-Medium Enterprises” The Indonesian Quarterly 27 31-42. 
 
International Institute for Management Development (2005) The World Competitiveness 
Scoreboard in IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, Lausanne, International Institute for 
Management Development.  
 
Khemani, R.S. (2000) “The Importance of Competition Law Policy in Fostering Economic Growth” 
paper presented at World Bank, ADB, USAID, Aus AID International Conference on Competition 
Policy and Economic Adjustment, Jakarta 
 
Kunchoro, Mudrajad (2004) “Study on Domestic Regulatory Constraints to Labor-Intensive 
Manufactured Exports,” paper presented at 6th IRSA International Conference “Regional 
Development in Transition: Governance, Public Services and Ecotourism, Jogjakarta,  August 13-
14. 
 
Loughlin, Coleen, S. Marks, A. Shauki, N. Sirait (1999) “Report on Competition Policy in 
Indonesia, Study funded by the Economic Law and Improved Procurement Systems Project 
(ELIPS) USAID-Government of Indonesia, USAID Project No. 0497 0372 
 10
 
Maarif, Syamsul 2004 “Some Challenges to the Enforcement of the Competition Law in 
Indonesia,” Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business,. 6(1), pp 45-64 
 
Pangestu, Mari, H. Aswicahuyono, T.Anas,  D. Ardyanto 2002 “ The Evolution of Competition 
Policy in Indonesia,” Review of Industrial Organization 21 205-224 
 
Thee Kian We 2002 “Competition Policy in Indonesia and the new Anti-Monopoly and Fair 
Competition Law,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 38 (3) 331-42 
 
Wignaraja, Ganeshan 2003 “Benchmarking competitiveness: a first look at the MECI,” in  
Wignaraja, Ganeshan editor Competiveness Strategy in Developing Countries, Routledge 
 
World Economic Forum (2005) Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005 New York; Oxford 
University Press. Also available at www.weforum.org  
 11
